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PHIPPS, Circuit Judge. 
 For over thirty years, Dr. Elias Karkalas was a family practice physician in a 
Philadelphia suburb.  He also had an interest in cyber medicine, and in 2005, he 
responded to a recruiter’s advertisement seeking doctors to review online prescription 
requests for an internet pharmacy company, Rx Limited.  At that time, Rx Limited was 
operated by Paul Calder Le Roux, who would later plead guilty to several criminal 
charges related to the company’s practices.  Karkalas began working for Rx Limited, and 
between 2005 and 2012, he approved online prescriptions for several drugs.  As he did 
so, he understood that federal law required an in-person encounter to prescribe a 
controlled substance.  See 21 U.S.C. §§ 829(b), (e); 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a). 
One drug that Karkalas prescribed online was Fioricet – a combination drug used 
to treat tension headaches.  Although Fioricet is not expressly listed as a controlled 
substance, it contains butalbital, a derivative of barbituric acid, which is listed as a 
controlled substance.  21 U.S.C. § 812, Sch. III(b)(1) (designating “[a]ny substance 
which contains any quantity of a derivative of barbituric acid” as a Schedule III 
controlled substance); 21 C.F.R. § 1308.13(c)(3) (same).  Nevertheless, the Physicians’ 
Desk Reference, a reference manual for prescribers, did not designate Fioricet as a 
controlled substance during the years in which Karkalas prescribed it.1   
 
1 The Physicians’ Desk Reference currently identifies Fioricet as a Schedule III controlled 
substance.  See Fioricet Capsules Drug Summary, Prescribers’ Digital Reference, 
https://www.pdr.net/drug-summary/Fioricet-Capsules-acetaminophen-butalbital-caffeine-
3284.2260 (last visited Feb. 9, 2021). 
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Karkalas’s online approval of Fioricet prescriptions caught the attention of a 
diversion investigator at the Drug Enforcement Administration and a federal prosecutor 
who were investigating Rx Limited.  They both believed that, under federal law, Fioricet 
constituted a controlled substance because it contained butalbital.  Through an 
undercover investigation, they learned that Karkalas was prescribing Fioricet online not 
just for tension headaches but also for other maladies such as knee pain and hemorrhoids.   
In 2013, a federal grand jury in Minnesota returned an 85-count indictment related 
to Rx Limited against eleven defendants.  It named Karkalas in 38 counts.  Many of those 
counts related to the illegal distribution of Fioricet, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(E), 
(h)(1), (h)(4), but the indictment also charged Karkalas with conspiracy, wire fraud, mail 
fraud, and introducing misbranded drugs into interstate commerce.  Karkalas was arrested 
at his office and detained pretrial for six months, including four-and-a-half months in 
detention centers in multiple states and six weeks in a halfway house.  He was later 
released to home confinement with an ankle monitor.   
Throughout the pretrial period, Karkalas asserted that Fioricet was not a controlled 
substance.  He emailed and called the prosecutor and investigator, and he even 
voluntarily traveled to Washington, D.C. to meet with them, but they were unconvinced.  
Karkalas also filed motions in the Minnesota trial court to dismiss the Fioricet charges 
and to exclude evidence of his distribution of Fioricet.  But that court denied both 
motions, concluding that Fioricet – because it contains butalbital – is a Schedule III 
controlled substance.  See United States v. Oz, 2017 WL 342069, at *2, *3–5 (D. Minn. 
Jan. 23, 2017) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 812, Sch. III(b)(1)); United States v. Oz, 2016 WL 
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1183041, at *2, *4–6 (D. Minn. Mar. 28, 2016).  Despite prevailing on those motions, the 
United States voluntarily dismissed ten of the charges against Karkalas related to his 
distribution of Fioricet.   
The case against Karkalas and three other defendants proceeded to a jury trial, and 
there it continued to turn in his favor.  In the middle of its case-in-chief, the United States 
dropped the remaining charges related to the distribution of Fioricet.  And in returning its 
verdict, the jury acquitted Karkalas and the other defendants of all other charges.   
To vindicate himself beyond that acquittal, Karkalas filed this two-count civil 
lawsuit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  In Count One of the complaint, Karkalas 
asserts that the prosecutor and investigator violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
rights by knowingly presenting false and misleading testimony and by prosecuting him 
without probable cause, leading to his unlawful pretrial detention.  In Count Two, 
Karkalas sues the United States for malicious prosecution under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act.   
The defendants moved to dismiss the counts against them – the prosecutor and 
investigator pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), 12(b)(3), and 
12(b)(6), and the United States pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).  The District 
Court granted those motions on several alternative grounds and dismissed Karkalas’s 
amended complaint with prejudice.  In doing so, the District Court exercised subject-
matter jurisdiction over the federal questions in Count One, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, but 
determined that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants.  In 
addition, the District Court determined that no Bivens cause of action could be implied 
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against those defendants, who were also shielded from suit due to qualified immunity 
(and the prosecutor further protected by absolute immunity).  On Count Two, the District 
Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction due to the United States’ sovereign immunity 
for discretionary functions and for intentional torts (the latter as to only the conduct of the 
prosecutor).  See id. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2674, 2680(a), (h).   
Karkalas timely appealed, bringing the case within this Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The individual defendants no longer press the 
personal jurisdiction defense, see Appellees’ Br. 15 n.3, thereby consenting to such 
jurisdiction.  See Danziger & De Llano, LLP v. Morgan Verkamp LLC, 948 F.3d 124, 
129 (3d Cir. 2020) (“A defendant may . . . consent to personal jurisdiction by waiving 
any objection to it.” (citing Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 
456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982))).  They have preserved and presented their other defenses.  In 
reviewing the dismissal of the complaint de novo, see Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 
452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006), we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
I. 
 In Count One, Karkalas sues the prosecutor and the investigator in their individual 
capacities, seeking to recover damages.  He does so through a judicially implied cause of 
action, a Bivens claim, which permits a damages remedy for a person whose 
constitutional rights have been violated by agents of the federal government.  See Ziglar 
v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1854 (2017).  See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).  In response, the individual 
defendants argue that a Bivens action is unavailable in this context, that the prosecutor 
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qualifies for absolute immunity, and that both defendants are entitled to qualified 
immunity.  The last of those arguments – qualified immunity – is the most natural starting 
place because it is common to both individual defendants and because it proves 
dispositive.   
Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages 
so long as “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800, 818 (1982); see also District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018); El v. 
City of Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 334 (3d Cir. 2020).  At the motion-to-dismiss stage, 
courts evaluate qualified immunity for a constitutional claim by examining (i) whether 
the complaint contains plausible allegations of a constitutional violation and (ii) whether 
the asserted constitutional right is clearly established.  See Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 
757 (2014) (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)); see also Conn v. 
Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999) (explaining that the qualified immunity inquiry 
requires “a court [to] determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an 
actual constitutional right at all”).   
To evaluate the first prong of qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss, this 
Court follows a three-step plausibility inquiry.  See Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 
809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 
(2009) (noting that “it is often beneficial” for courts to address the two prongs of the 
qualified immunity analysis in order, even though it is no longer mandatory).  The first 
step involves an articulation of the elements of the claim.  See Connelly, 809 F.3d at 787 
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(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)).  The second step scrutinizes the 
complaint to identify and disregard any ‘“formulaic recitation of the elements of a . . . 
claim’ or other legal conclusion,” id. at 789 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681), as well as 
allegations that “while not stating ultimate legal conclusions, are nevertheless so 
threadbare or speculative that they fail to cross the line between the conclusory and the 
factual,” id. at 790 (quoting Peñalbert-Rosa v. Fortuño-Burset, 631 F.3d 592, 595 (1st 
Cir. 2011)).  The third step evaluates the plausibility of the remaining allegations – after 
first assuming their veracity, construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 
and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.  See id. at 787, 790; see 
also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 
2009).  At that point, if a complaint alleges “enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable 
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of” the necessary elements of a claim, 
then it plausibly pleads a claim.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007); 
see also Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008).  But if “a 
complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops 
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.”  Iqbal, 
556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).   
As set forth below, under this plausibility analysis, Karkalas fails to state a claim 
for a constitutional violation under Count One.  And because the complaint fails to 
plausibly allege that the prosecutor or investigator violated Karkalas’s constitutional 
rights, those individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.  That conclusion 
renders unnecessary an analysis of the second prong of qualified immunity, as well as the 
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other defenses related to absolute immunity and the unavailability of a Bivens action in 
this context.  See Wood, 572 U.S. at 757 (assuming without deciding that a Bivens cause 
of action is available and resolving based on qualified immunity); Hui v. Castaneda, 
559 U.S. 799, 807 (2010) (“Even in circumstances in which a Bivens remedy is generally 
available, an action under Bivens will be defeated if the defendant is immune from suit.”).  
A. 
Karkalas first brings a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim against the 
individual defendants.  See Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 919 (2017) (“If the 
complaint is that a form of legal process resulted in pretrial detention unsupported by 
probable cause, then the right allegedly infringed lies in the Fourth Amendment.”).  
Under the three-step plausibility inquiry, he fails to allege a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
1.  Articulation of the elements.  A claim for Fourth Amendment malicious 
prosecution consists of the following elements:  
(1)  the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding;  
(2)  without probable cause;  
(3)  maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to 
justice;  
(4)  causing the plaintiff to suffer a deprivation of liberty consistent with 
the concept of seizure; and 
(5)  the outcome of the criminal proceeding favored the plaintiff. 
See Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 203 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); see also 
Black v. Montgomery County, 835 F.3d 358, 364 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). 
 
9 
 2.  Identification of deficient allegations.  Several of Karkalas’s conclusory 
allegations should be disregarded.  In particular, Karkalas alleges that the individual 
defendants made “knowingly false presentations” to the grand jury, namely, (i) that 
Fioricet is a controlled medication, (ii) that Karkalas knew so, and (iii) that he would 
continue to prescribe it.  First Amended Complaint ¶ 86 (App. 77).  But grand jury 
proceedings are shrouded in secrecy.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2)(B); see also Rehberg 
v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 374 (2012) (“We consistently have recognized that the proper 
functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of grand jury 
proceedings.” (citations omitted)); United States v. Smith, 123 F.3d 140, 148 (3d Cir. 
1997) (“Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) is intended to preserve the tradition of grand jury secrecy, 
creating a general rule of confidentiality for all ‘matters occurring before the grand 
jury.’”).  And the complaint nowhere indicates how Karkalas became privy to this secret 
information.  See District Ct. Op. 32 (App. 32) (“Given the secrecy of the grand jury 
proceeding, we question how Dr. Karkalas knows what [the prosecutor and investigator] 
told the grand jury . . . .”).  Without providing a factual basis for his purported knowledge 
of the grand jury proceedings, Karkalas’s allegations that the individual defendants made 
false statements to the grand jury are “speculative” and “threadbare.”  Connelly, 809 F.3d 
at 790; see also Oliver v. Roquet, 858 F.3d 180, 192 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[A] plaintiff’s 
allegations ‘must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,’ and 
must reflect ‘more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.’” 
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)); Peñalbert-Rosa, 
631 F.3d at 595–96 (“[S]ometimes a threadbare factual allegation bears insignia of its 
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speculative character and, absent greater concreteness, invites an early challenge.”).  As 
such, those allegations must be excluded from the plausibility analysis. 
Similarly, the complaint alleges that the prosecutor and investigator acted “with 
malice” in initiating the criminal proceeding against Karkalas.  First Amended Complaint 
¶ 88 (App. 78).  But without supporting factual allegations, that is nothing more than a 
conclusory reformulation of the malice element of a Fourth Amendment malicious 
prosecution claim, which should be disregarded.  See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“[A] 
plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more 
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 
action will not do.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
 3.  Evaluation of the remaining allegations.  Without crediting the deficient 
allegations, Karkalas has failed to plausibly allege two essential elements of a Fourth 
Amendment malicious prosecution claim: lack of probable cause and malice.  A federal 
indictment triggers a rebuttable presumption of probable cause to prosecute.  See 
Goodwin v. Conway, 836 F.3d 321, 329 (3d Cir. 2016); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 353 
(3d Cir. 1989); see also Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 328 (2014) (“[A]n 
indictment fair upon its face and returned by a properly constituted grand jury . . . 
conclusively determines the existence of probable cause to believe the defendant 
perpetrated the offense alleged.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).  And 
without the allegations concerning the individual defendants’ statements to the grand 
jury, the remainder of the complaint does not rebut that presumption.  See Rose, 871 F.2d 
at 353 (explaining that the presumption of probable cause “may be rebutted by evidence 
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that the [indictment] was procured by fraud, perjury or other corrupt means”).  Likewise, 
without the excluded conclusory allegation of malice, the remaining allegations – which 
do not reflect a prosecution motivated by “ill will” or “spite” or some “extraneous 
improper purpose,” Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1502 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation 
omitted) – do not plausibly suggest that the prosecutor or the investigator acted 
maliciously. 
Karkalas has therefore failed to state a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution 
claim, as the complaint does not plausibly allege two necessary elements.  Accordingly, 
the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for this claim.  See Bennett v. 
Murphy, 274 F.3d 133, 136 (3d Cir. 2001) (“If the plaintiff fails to make out a 
constitutional violation, the qualified immunity inquiry is at an end; the officer is entitled 
to immunity.”). 
B. 
 Karkalas also sues the individual defendants for using fabricated evidence against 
him in violation of the Fifth Amendment.  See Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 289 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (“When falsified evidence is used as a basis to initiate the prosecution of a 
defendant, . . . the defendant has been injured regardless of whether the totality of the 
evidence, excluding the fabricated evidence, would have given the state actor a probable 
cause defense in a malicious prosecution action . . . .”).  The plausibility analysis for this 
claim proceeds along the same lines as above, yielding a similar result: Karkalas does not 
state a plausible claim for a violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
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1.  Articulation of the elements.  For an acquitted criminal defendant, a due 
process fabricated evidence claim consists of the following elements: 
(1)  a government actor’s production or introduction of evidence or 
testimony; 
(2)  at any point before or during a criminal proceeding; 
(3)  that the government actor knew to be; 
(4)  false; and 
(5)  without that fabricated evidence, there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the defendant would not have been criminally charged. 
See Black, 835 F.3d at 370–72; Halsey, 750 F.3d at 294–95; see also Caldwell v. City & 
County of San Francisco, 889 F.3d 1105, 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2018); Zahrey v. Coffey, 
221 F.3d 342, 348–49, 355 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 2.  Identification of deficient allegations.  As before, Karkalas’s allegations as to 
the statements made to the grand jury are too speculative for inclusion in the plausibility 
analysis. 
3.  Evaluation of the remaining allegations.  Without the disregarded allegations, 
Karkalas does not plausibly allege any element of a fabricated evidence claim.  He 
attempts to compensate for this shortcoming by referencing statements that the prosecutor 
made before the Magistrate Judge at the pretrial detention hearing.  Those statements 
include the assertions that Karkalas was involved with an international drug cartel, that 
his actions resulted in several drug related deaths, that the evidence against him was 
overwhelming, and that he presented a flight risk.  But the prosecutor made those 
statements not through testimony or the admission of evidence, but rather through 
advocacy – arguing that Karkalas should be detained pursuant to a statutory presumption 
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against release based on the nature of his charges, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(A).  
Beyond the dispositive facts that those statements were not evidence and were made after 
Karkalas was charged, the complaint still lacks any non-conclusory allegations that the 
prosecutor knew her statements to be false when she made them.  See Halsey, 750 F.3d at 
295 (“[T]estimony that is incorrect or simply disputed should not be treated as fabricated 
merely because it turns out to have been wrong.”).  Absent plausible allegations stating a 
fabricated evidence claim, the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.  
See id. at 295 (“[W]e expect that it will be an unusual case in which a police officer 
cannot obtain a summary judgment in a civil action charging him with having fabricated 
evidence used in an earlier criminal case.”). 
II. 
In Count Two, Karkalas sues the United States for the state-law tort of malicious 
prosecution under the Federal Tort Claims Act.  The FTCA exposes the United States to 
tort liability by waiving its sovereign immunity for certain claims.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1346(b)(1), 2674.  But that waiver is limited by several exceptions, and the United 
States invokes two of those jurisdictional defenses here: the discretionary function 
exception, id. § 2680(a), and the intentional tort exception, id. § 2680(h).  As explained 
below, the discretionary function exception bars Karkalas’s malicious prosecution claim, 
making it unnecessary to evaluate the United States’ remaining defenses. 
The discretionary function exception is aptly named.  It bars suits against the 
United States that challenge “the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of . . . an employee of the 
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Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”  Id. § 2680(a).  It applies 
when the challenged acts (i) “involve[d] an element of judgment or choice,” and (ii) were 
“based on considerations of public policy.”  United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322–
23 (1991) (quoting Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536–37 (1988)); see also 
Merando v. United States, 517 F.3d 160, 164–65 (3d Cir. 2008).  Although the exception 
is “jurisdictional on its face,” S.R.P. ex rel. Abunabba v. United States, 676 F.3d 329, 333 
n.2 (3d Cir. 2012), the United States “has the burden of proving the applicability of the 
discretionary function exception,” Merando, 517 F.3d at 164 (citations omitted).  Here, 
where the challenged acts involve the investigation and prosecution of Karkalas, the 
United States has met that burden. 
Both the investigation and the prosecution of Karkalas satisfy the first element of 
the discretionary function exception.  Investigation and prosecution involve judgment or 
choice.  See Pooler v. United States, 787 F.2d 868, 871 (3d Cir. 1986) (“Prosecutorial 
decisions as to whether, when and against whom to initiate prosecution are quintessential 
examples of governmental discretion in enforcing the criminal law.” (citations omitted)), 
abrogated on other grounds by Millbrook v. United States, 569 U.S. 50 (2013); Bernitsky 
v. United States, 620 F.2d 948, 955 (3d Cir. 1980) (“Decision making as to investigation 
and enforcement, particularly when there are different types of enforcement action 
available, are discretionary judgments.”).   
Similarly, those actions satisfy the second element.  Investigatory and 
prosecutorial decisions are “susceptible to policy analysis.”  Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325; 
see Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 865 (2014) (“Prosecutorial discretion involves 
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carefully weighing the benefits of a prosecution against the evidence needed to convict, 
the resources of the public fisc, and the public policy of the State.”); Baer v. United 
States, 722 F.3d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Whether to pursue a lead, to request a 
document, or to assign additional examiners to an investigation are all discretionary 
decisions, which necessarily involve considerations of . . . resource allocation and 
opportunity costs.”). 
Karkalas does not challenge those straightforward conclusions directly.  Rather, he 
contends that, even with the government’s broad discretion to investigate and prosecute 
crimes, “there is no discretion to violate the Constitution.”  Appellant’s Br. 22; see also 
Pooler, 787 F.2d at 871 (stating in dicta that “federal officials do not possess discretion” 
to violate “constitutional rights or federal statutes”).  But this case does not present an 
opportunity to evaluate that legal theory because, as explained above, Karkalas does not 
allege plausible violations of the Constitution.  Without such allegations, “all of the 
challenged actions . . . involved the exercise of discretion in furtherance of public policy 
goals,” Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 334, and the United States thus retains its sovereign 
immunity for this claim. 
*  *  * 
 In sum, the District Court properly dismissed the Bivens claims against the 
prosecutor and the investigator as well as the FTCA claim against the United States.  We 
will affirm. 
